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The topic of this chapter is the development of Dutch Christian
Democracy between 1945 and 1995. It should be noted at the outset,
however, that unlike several of its neighbouring countries, the Netherlands
did not have a unified Christian Democratic party until 1980. Before·that,
there were three major religious parties: the orthodox Protestant Anti-Revo-
lutionary Party (ARP) and Christian-Historical Union (CHU) and the Catho-
lic People's Party (KVP; between 1926 and 1945 called the Roman Catholic
State Party or RKSP). Some authors have emphasized the Christian Demo-
cratic character of the Catholic party 1. Others hardly even mention the
Protestants while dealing with Christian Democracy in the 19th century 2.
Although from a comparative point of view it may be true that Christian
Democracy is essentially a Roman Catholic movement3, in the Netherlands
the two orthodox Protestant parties should be regarded as "embryo Christian
Democratic parties" as well 4. As a matter of fact, neither the relatively high
ideological profile of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) nor the
disproportionately large ideological influence that this party has had within
the European People's Party (EPP) can be properly explained without taking
into account the political philosophies of its three predecessors 5. Therefore,
1. lA. Bornewasser, "Denkbeelden over christen-democratie in katholiek Nederland.
Verschuivend begrip en veranderende werkelijldieid 1892-1973", Trajecta, III (1994)
131-154.
2. A.F. Manning, "Niederlande und Belgien: Christliche Demokratie im 19.
Jahrhundert" in: W. Becker and R. Morsey, ed., Christliche Demokratie in Europa.
Grundlagen und Entwicklungen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (Cologne-Vienna, 1988),
91-112.
3. Essentially, if only because Protestant variants of Christian Democracy also exist in
Scandinavia. See D. Hanley, "Introduction: Christian Democracy as a political
phenomenon" in: D. Hanley, ed., Christian Democracy in Europe. A Comparative
Perspective (London-New York, 1994), 1-11, at 8.
4. R.E.M. Irving, The Christian Democratic Parties ofWestern Europe (London, 1979),
113. Several smaller orthodox Protestant parties - notably the Political Reformed
Party (SGP, founded in 1918 and currently the oldest political party in the
Netherlands), the Reformed Political League (GPV) and the Reformed Political
Federation (RPF) - are, on the contrary, purely confessional parties which reject
Christian Democracy and will therefore not be dealt with in this chapter. The same
applies to the various smaller Roman Catholic parties that have from time to time
existed but that have in general been more short-lived.
5. R.A. Koole and H.-M. ten Napel, "De conservatieve verleiding.
Christen-democratische machtsvorming op Europees niveau", Civis Mundi.
Tijdschrift voor politieke filosofie en cultuur, XXXII (1993) 12-18.
this chapter will have to consist of two parts that deal with the ARP, the CHU
and the KVPbetween 1945 and 1980 (section 3), and the CDA between 1980
and 1995 (section 4).
Since it is impossible, moreover, to understand the developments within
the ARP, the CHU and the KVP in the post-war pe:t;iod without first
considering the religious and political situation in the 19th and early 20th
centuries, I will start out with some remarks on the historical background
before 1945 (section 2). Since the Second World War provided much less
of a historical break in the Netherlands than in other Western European
countries, the part of this chapter that deals with the historical background
will be somewhat more detailed than the part that deals with the three
religious parties between 1945 and 1980. I will end with a conclusion
(section 5).
2. Historical background before 1945
The single most important characteristic of Dutch politics is without
doubt that the Netherlands is a pluralistic society, a country of religious and
political minorities. Two cleavages have traditionally been of particular
importance: religion and social class. The oldest, and in many respects the
most important, of the two is religion. As one observer recently put it: "The
political impact of the fundamental religious cleavage on Dutch society,
expressed both as a liberal-confessional conflict and as a Calvinist-Catholic
antithesis, can hardly be overstated. Religious strife and dissension constitute
one of the major continuities in the history of this nation. The religious
cleavage controlled Dutch politics during the second half of the 19th century;
it was the single most important cause for the rise of the "pillarised" structure
of the political system (1917-1967), and it determined the dominance of
Christian and Catholic parties during most of the 20th century. In effect,
religious conflicts and pillarisation explain why an interdenominational
Christian Democratic party did not arise until 1980" 6.
As a result of the religious cleavage, Dutch society has since the
Reformation and the revolt against the Spanish (1568-1648) consisted,
roughly speaking?, of three groups: Roman Catholics (the oldest group),
orthodox Protestants and a secular or humanistic minority. Although the
size of the different groups as well as the relations between them have
naturally varied in the course of the centuries, these three groups with their
fundamentally distinctive identities have always been there and still are. The
presence of these three groups is illustrated by the fact that it has proven
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to write a truly comprehensive political
and social history of the Netherlands. To be sure, each of the three groups
6. K. van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism. A Study of Christian Democracy and the
Welfare State (London-New York, 1995) 43.
7. Roughly speaking, if only because - certainly in the beginning - many Humanists were
practising Christians.
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has brought forth its own gifted, sometimes excellent, historians 8. Thus
examples of fine Roman Catholic historians include W.J.F. Nuyens, G. Brom
and L.J. Rogier. Examples of talented orthodox Protestant historians are
G. Groen van Prinsterer and C. Gerretson. Finally, examples of outstanding
humanistic historians include R. Fruin, J. Huizinga and J. Presser. The first
real "synthesis" has yet to be written, however, despite claims to the contrary.
Although from the outset three minorities can thus be distinguished in
Dutch society, in the first half of the 19th century it was still possible to speak
- as in several other Western European countries - of a conservative/liberal
dichotomy in parliament. The Liberals were politically dominant,
J.R. Thorbecke being their renowned leader. Despite, or maybe partly
because of, their dominant position the Liberals have traditionally remained
less organised than the three other political families 9. Thus, the first liberal
party was formed only in 1885, mainly in reaction to the formation of the
religious parties. Also, until the Second World War, and again after 1966,
there have been at least two separate Liberal parties because of differences
of opinion with regard to things like universal suffrage and the role of the
state in social and economic life: the conservative-liberal Liberal Union (LU,
since 1921 called Liberal State Party or LSP) and the progressive-liberal
Radical Democratic League (VDB, founded in 1901).
Meanwhile, around 1850, the orthodox Protestant historian and states-
man G. Groen van Prinsterer had begun to emancipate himself ideologically
and politically from the rival political group, the Conservatives. In this
process, which had already started in the 1830s and which can only be
explained against the background of the modernistic religious and theologi-
cal climate of those years, the lectures he gave for friends during the winter
of 1845-1846 on the topic of "Unbelief and Revolution" played an important
role 10. Although Groen van Prinsterer would stand practically alone in
parliament for another two decades, he indirectly laid the foundations for
what in 1879 became the first national party organisation in Holland, the
orthodox Protestant ARP 11. The name Anti-Revolutionary Party referred
to the French Revolution, which because of the principle of ni Dieu, ni maitre
was interpreted as'a revolt against God. Its first leader was the charismatic
A. Kuyper, who had also authored the party's first program. A.F. de Savornin
Lohman was elected leader of the parliamentary party. Very soon, in 1894,
de Savornin Lohman and several other more conservative members left the
ARP, universal suffrage being one of the divisive issues, as in the case of
the Liberals. In 1908, they joined with two other small religious parties to
form the CHU 12. While most adherents of the CHU belonged to the
8. G. Puchinger, Ontmoetingen met historici (Zutphen, 1979).
9. G. Taal, Liberalen en radicalen in Nederland (1872-1901) (The Hague, 1980).
10. G. Groen van Prinsterer, Ongeloof en revolutie. Een reeks van historische voorlezingen
(Kampen, 1922 [1847]).
11. J.A. de Wilde and C. Smeenk, Het volk ten baat. De geschiedenis van de AR-partij
(Groningen, 1949).
12. H. van Spanning, De Christelijk-Historische Unie (1908-1980). Enige hoofdlijnen uit
haar geschiedenis (Leiden, 1988).
Dutch Reformed Church, the ARP drew its support largely from the Calvinist
churches that had been founded by Kuyper in 1892 but went back to the
schisms of 1834 and 1886.
Although a Catholic party was not formally established until 1926, the
Roman Catholics were the second minority in Dutch society to begin to
organise itself politically 13. Originally, the Roman 'Catholic Members of
Parliament had worked closely with the Liberals. The reason for this was
that they had been discriminated against in the time of the Dutch Republic
(1579-1795), when the orthodox Protestants, despite their being a minority,
were the culturally and economically dominant group and had acted very
much as if the Netherlands was a Protestant country. The Roman Catholics
expected - not without reason - to benefit from cooperating in politics with
the Liberals, as the latter were preparing the constitutional revision of 1848,
which not only paved the 'way for modern parliamentary government but
also included the introduction of a bill of religious and other rights. As' a
result, despite an emotional appeal from a number of orthodox Protestants
to the King, the episcopal hierarchy was re-established in the Netherlands in
1853. During the 1860s, however, the Roman Catholics and the Liberals
gradually grew apart. One of the main reasons for this was that the Vatican,
as well as the Dutch bishops, began to stress the necessity of separate Roman
Catholic schools, something the Liberals opposed. Following the example
of Kuyper, a poet and priest by the name of H.J.A.M. Schaepman wrote the
first Roman Catholic political program in 1883. Yet, as I noted above, it
would take until 1926 before the first authentic Roman Catholic party was
founded. One explanation for this was that the Roman Catholics long
remained somewhat hesitant to manifest themselves politically after having
been treated as second-class citizens for centuries. Second, for the Roman
Catholics, political action was and has always remained less central than
activities in other sectors of society. In this they differed from the orthodox
Protestants and, albeit to a lesser extent, the Socialists.
Not only did the orthodox Protestants and Roman Catholics start to
organise politically in the second half of the 19th century, relatively soon
they also began to cooperate closely in parliament and cabinet in the so-called
Coalition. This was a remarkable development, given that it occurred in a
country in which orthodox Protestants and Roman Catholics had gone their
separate ways for centuries and in a period of time in which of course no
ecumenical contacts whatsoever existed between their respective churches.
That the Coalition was formed can to a large extent be attributed to the goal
of public financing of religious schools that the two political groups had in
common, but as so often the good personal relations between Kuyper and
de Savornin Lohman, on the one hand, and Schaepman, on the other, were
instrumental as well. The Coalition of orthodox Protestants and Roman
Catholics resulted in a number of cabinets, especially after the introduction
of a system of proportional representation and universal suffrage in 1917.
Between 1848 and 1917, the Netherlands had had a single-member district
13. L.]. Rogier and N. de Rooy, In vrijheid herboren. Katholiek Nederland 1853-1953
(The Hague, 1953).
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system and cabinets had consisted of either the Liberal parties or the religious
parties. Because of the introduction of proportional representation and
universal suffrage a year earlier, in 1918 the Liberals were reduced in size
while the three major religious parties together acquired an absolute majority
of the seats in the Second Chamber, which they would not have to give up
untiI1967 14. Partly as a result, between 1918 and 1994 the Roman Catholics
in particular have participated in every15 cabinet. The Coalition of Roman
Catholics and orthodox Protestants broke up definitively already in 1939,
however. One reason was that the ARP had developed in a conservative
direction during the 1930s, whereas the RKSP as well as the CHU had
gradually advocated somewhat more progressive policies in order to combat
the international economic recession. There had, however, been a growing
number of policy differences between the religious parties already since
1917, when the common goal of the financial equalisation of public and
private primary schools had been reached (the so-called "Pacification").
Before the Coalition definitively broke up during the 1930s, the Anti-
revolutionary Prime Minister H. Colijn occasionally broadened the Coalition
with the Liberals, something he had already been in favour of since at least
1913 16.
Industrialisation in the Netherlands took place later than in other
Western European countries. Therefore, the second cleavage mentioned
above - social class - did not become important until around 1880. More-
over, because of the binding force that religion constituted within both the
Roman Catholic and orthodox Protestant parts of the population, only the
humanistic third group was actually split in two as a result of this cleavage.
Thus, since about the end of the 19th century, it was possible to speak of
four political families in Dutch society: the Roman Catholics, the orthodox
Protestants, the secular middle class or the Liberals and the secular working
class or the Socialists. The secular working class organised itself in the Social
Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP, founded in 1894), with P.}. Troelstra as
its first leader17. The Socialists would remain in opposition at the national
level until 1939, when a cabinet of Christian Historicals and Roman Catho-
lics was formed and for the first time, contained two Socialists 18.
Finally, what makes the Dutch (and indeed the Belgian) case interesting
from a comparative point ofview is that for the better part of the 20th century
three of the four political minorities mentioned earlier - the Roman Catho-
lics, the orthodox Protestants and the Socialists - have in effect been tightly
organised subcultures that structured most, if not all, aspects of political,
14. In the parliamentary elections of 1959, the three religious parties acquired exactly half
of the seats (75 out of 150).
15. Except in the short-lived CoHjn V cabinet in 1939.
16. G. Puchinger, Colijn en het einde van de Coalitie, I, De geschiedenis van de
kabinetsformaties 1918-1924 (Kampen, 1969), 13-14, 102-109; Id., Colijn en het
einde van de Coalitie, III, De geschiedenis van de kabinetsformaties 1933-1939
(Leiden, 1993), 71.
17. J. Perry et aI., Honderd jaar sociaal-democratie in Nederland, 1894-1994 (Amsterdam,
1994).
18. In addition, there was one minister with an Antirevolutionary background in this
cabinet, however against the will of the leadership of this party.
social and also personal life. In Dutch these subcultures are usually known
as "zuilen" or pillars. The segmentation of Dutch society into these different
subcultures is called "verzuiling" or pillarisation. I am somewhat hesitant to
use this term, however, first of all because it is a rather strange metaphor,
and second because for many social scientists as well as historians it has an
outright negative meaning19, whereas from a political science point of view
it is at least equally possible to argue that the attempt that was made by people
and organisations during the heyday of pillarisation to maintain an explicit
relationship between their religious and other beliefs and social and political
action should be preferred to the rather technocratic and uninspired charac-
ter of Dutch politics today.
3. The ARP, the CHU and the KVP between 1945 and 1980
Following the Second World War, another major attempt at a "break-
through" of the Dutch party system was launched by the Socialists, the main
reason being that as a result of the pillarisation of Dutch society, they could
only appeal to the non-religious voters. Therefore, unlike in neighbouring
countries, they were not able to attract more than 20% to 25% of the national
vote. More specifically, the Socialists in a sense tried to reintroduce the
two-party and one-dimensional party system that the Netherlands had
known in the first part of the 19th century 20. Like the earlier attempt
undertaken by Groen van Prinsterer around 1850, however, this ·second
"breakthrough" initially remained unsuccessful. Before too long, after the
possibility of the formation of a unified Protestan,t People's Party had been
briefly discussed, the two major orthodox Protestant parties re-emerged,
while the Roman Catholic State Party merely changed its name into Catholic
People's Party (KVP) 21. As a result, although an ideologically somewhat
broader formation, the Labour Party (PvdA) which was founded in 1946,
closely resembled its immediate predecessor, the SDAP. This was even more
the case after P.J. Gud, together with a small group of progressive Liberals
who had formerly belonged to the VDB but had joined the PvdA after the
War, became disenchanted and left the party again in 1947. A year later,
this group of progressive Liberals joined with the conservative-liberal Party
of Freedom (PvdV, founded in 1945 as the successor of the LSP), to form
the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Therefore, after
1945 the Netherlands retained its multiparty system as well as its multidi-
mensional party system. By now, the major parties of the Roman Catholic,
the orthodox Protestant, the Socialist, and the Liberal political families were,
respectively, the KVP, the ARP and the CHU, the PvdA, and the VVD.
19. See G. Puchinger, "Verzuiling??-Ontzuiling??", Tml1spaml1t. Orgaan van de
Vereniging van Christen-Historici, IV (1993) 4-8.
20. As will have become clear from the previous section, no political parties in the modern
sense of the word had yet been founded at that time. Therefore, the use of the term
"party system" is somewhat problematic in this context.
21. ].A. Bornewasser, Katholieke Volkspartij 1945-1980, I, Herkomst en groei (tot 1963)
(Nijmegen, 1995).
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As far as the importance of the two traditional cleavages in Dutch society
are concerned, however, there was a change in that after World War II social
class instead of religion would for a while become the most important cleav-
age 22. Central issues inch,lded the reconstruction of the country after the
Second World War and the development of the welfare state. Partly as a result,
there was once again - as in 1918 - a significant change as far as the composition
of the cabinets was concerned. The Socialists, who had entered government
for the first time in 1939, continued to take part in a series of broad
"Roman-Red" coalitions in the years immediately following the War. From
1948 to 1958 these were headed by a Socialist prime minister, W. Drees.
Between 1959 and 1989, however, the three religious parties worked together
mostly with the Liberals (that is, 24 out of 30 years). Some political scientists
have argued that this was only natural since especially the Catholic party was
not so much a centre party but socioeconomically speaking a party of the Right
and thus ideologically closer to the Liberals than to the Socialists 23. Others,
however, have - more correctly, I believe - pointed out that this relatively long
period of isolation between 1959 and 1989 was at least partly the Socialists'
own fault 24. More specifically, the relationship between the religious parties
and the Socialists almost inevitably had to suffer from the polarisation strategy
adopted by the latter in the 1960s and 1970s, which will be dealt with later.
Because of the temporary importance of the socioeconomic cleavage, the
Socialists and the conservative Liberals worked together in only two cabinets
up until 1994, Drees I (1948-1951) and Drees II (1951-1952). Between 1959
and 1977, the conservative Liberals even explicitly excluded the possibility of
their cooperating within cabinet with the Socialists25, thus making it signifi-
cantly easier for the KVP, in particular to play its pivotal role in Dutch politics
than it would otherwise have been.
Meanwhile, in 1966 a party called Democrats '66 (D'66, later changed
into D66) was founded. Over the years, this party has developed into a
progressive-liberal system party not unlike the pre-War VDB, as opposed to
the conservative-liberal VVD. Its original purpose, however, was to "ex-
plode" the pillarised party system. By the time D'66 was founded, the
traditional pillars in Dutch society had, as a result of secularisation and
individualisation processes and a number of theological and other factors like
the arrival of modern television and the effects of generational change,
22. R.A. Koole and H.-M. ten Napel, "De riante positie in het vermaledijde 'midden'.
Confessionele machtsvorming op nationaal niveau" in: P. Luykx and H. Righart, ed.,
Van de pastorie naar het torentje. Een eeuw confessionele politiek ('S Gravenhage,
1991), 72-92. See also H.-M. ten Napel, "The Dutch party system in crisis" in:
D. Broughton and M. Donovan, ed., Changing Party Systems in Western Europe
(forthcoming) .
23. H. Daudt, "De ontwikkeling van de politieke machtsverhoudingen in Nederland sinds
1945" in: ].E. Ellemers et al., Nederland na 1945. Beschouwingen over ontwikkeling
en beleid (Deventer, 1980), 178-197.
24. See, for example,]. Bosmans, "Historische twijfel aan de 'uiterste noodzaak': de onzin
van Daudt", Acta Politica, XXII (1987) 227-233.
25. ].M.M.]. Clerx and R.].]. Stevens, "Polarisatie als ideologisch surrogaat. De nieuwe
antithese VVD-PvdA, 1959-1971" in: P.G.c. van Schie, ed., Tussen polarisatie en
paars. De 100-jarige verhouding tussen liberalen en socialisten in Nederland (Kampen,
1995), 115-126.
already started to crumble, though thus far they have not completely disap-
peared. On the contrary, important areas like education, broadcasting and
health care, despite changes, remain more or less segmented 26. As far as
political life is concerned, the parliamentary election of 1967 marked a
turning point. Until 1994, it was the only real "historic" national election
the Netherlands had experienced since the introduction of the system of
proportional representation and universal suffrage in 1917. First of all, as
was mentioned above, in this election the three religious parties lost their
combined parliamentary majority which they had enjoyed for fifty years in
a row. Second, the KVP in particular lost dramatically. As a matter of fact,
in just nine years - between 1963 and 1972 - the party lost almost half its
seats in parliament. Third, the PvdA also reached a historic low-point of
23.6% of the vote. Fourth, the Liberals, who had always opposed the
principle of pillarisation because of their conviction that religion was and
had to remain essentially a private matter, gained one seat. Fifth, the new
party D '66 was particulary highly successful in 1967. As in other Western
European countries and the United States of America, new "post-materialist"
issues - such as 'the environment, peace, and the need for individual self-ex-
pression - appeared,on the political agenda. As will become clear from what
follows, however, in the end these issues would not replace religion and social
class as the two most important cleavages in Dutch politics.
Partly because of the heavy losses of the religious parties, the progressive
parties - but to a certain extent also the Liberals - adopted the so-called
polarisation strategy 27. By doing away with the accommodationist style of
the 1940s and 1950s, it was hoped that the electorate would be forced into
two opposing camps. The religious parties would then either have to choose
for cooperation with the left-wing parties or with the right-wing parties. In
either case they would split and, as a result, disappear. Thus, the main
purpose of this strategy was to achieve the "breakthrough" in the party system
that had failed immediately after the Second World War. Once again, the
effort turned out to be in vain, however, and eventually even counter-pro-
ductive because this relatively hostile political environment proved to be an
extra stimulus for the eventual merger, in 1980, of the two major orthodox
Protestant parties and the KVP into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA).
Other incentives for the merger, which was not obvious, included the
decreasing hold which the ARP, the CHU and the KVP had upon their
respective Protestant and Catholic electorates; the desire of important por-
tions of the Roman Catholic and orthodox Protestant subcultures to maintain
an explicit relation between the Christian faith and political action; the fact
that the leaders of the three parties had come to know each other in the
Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (the European Christian Democratic
Movement); the strong desire within all three parties for co-operation at the
municipal and provincial levels; and the role played by party leaders and
26. ].c. Kennedy, NieuLU Babylon in aanbouw. Nederland in de jaren zestig (Meppel,
1995).
27. H. Daalder, "Changing procedures and changing strategies in Dutch
coalition-building", Legislative Studies Quarterly, IX (1986) 507-531.
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parliamentary leaders of the three parties such as B.W. Biesheuvel and J. de
Koning (ARP), A.D.W. Tilanus and O.W.A. Baron van Verschuer (CHU) and
W.K.N. Schmelzer, F.H.].]. Andriessen and, last but not least, P.A.J.M.
Steenkamp (KVP) 28. Ideologically speaking, the merger of the three major
religious parties was made possible by the process of convergence between
the Roman Catholic and Anti-revolutionary political philosophies that had
taken place between 1955 and 1965, that is, well before the electoral losses
of 1967 29•
The main obstacles, apart from organisational inertia, in the process
were: the fact that the electoral losses did not hit the ARP, the CHU and the
KVP simultaneously or to the same extent; personal rivalries; and differences
of view concerning the basic principles and policies of both the three old
parties and the new CDA as well as the fact that, in practice, the two issues
turned out to be very much interrelated. Part of the leadership of the ARP
wanted the CDA to adopt a radical attitude and considered explicitly stated
Christian principles to be a guarantee for this. On the other hand, those
Catholics who were in favour of a more progressive policy believed that
deconfessionalisation of the party was a prerequisite for such a course. In
the end, it was agreed that the CDA would accept the biblical evidence of
God's promises, acts and commandments as of decisive significance for
mankind, society and government. At the same time, however, the CDA
would address itself to the entire Dutch population, irrespective of religious
belief or social level. This political conviction, which is worked out in a
programme of basic principles and which is considered as the political answer
to the appeal made by the Bible, is the binding element that everyone in the
CDA must uphold, not the Bible itself. In this respect, the CDA resembles
other European Christian Democratic parties. At the same time, however,
it is also clear that, by merging, the religious parties have certainly not
undergone a complete metamorphosis into their very opposite. The basic
principles of the newly formed CDA are almost the same as those of the
Flemish Christian People's Party (CVP) - not surprisingly, because of the
contacts between the two Dutch-speaking parties 30: justice, differentiated
responsibility, solidarity and stewardship. Like the CVP, the CDA claims
that a series of policy orientations and political values are derived from these
principles. In practice, it is first and foremost the ceaseless attempt to
integrate and reconcile a plurality of societal groups with potentially oppos-
ing interests that makes the CDA distinctive 31. Another distinctive element
of Christian Democratic political thought in the Netherlands concerns its
28. H.-M. ten Napel, "Een eigen weg". De totstandkoming van het CDA (1952-1980)
(Kampen, 1992).
29. R.S. Zwart, "Gods wil in Nederland". Christelijke ideologieen en de vorming van het
CDA (1880-1980) (Kampen, 1996).
30. P. Lucardie and H.-M. ten Nape1, "Between confessionalism and liberal conservatism:
the Christian Democratic parties of Belgium and the Netherlands" in: D. Hanley, ed.,
Christian Democracy in Europe. A Comparative Perspective (London-New York,
1994),51-70.
31. K. van Kersbergen and H.-M. ten Napel, "The Philosophy, Policies and Perspectives
of European Christian Democracy", The Allen Review. An OxfordJournal of Catholic
ThOtI!?ht, (1994) 7-10.
resolutely pro-European character. Finally, the CDA differs from other
political movements with respect to issues that concern morality, such as
abortion and euthanasia, although distinctiveness on these points should not
be exaggerated. Moreover, as a result of the multiparty system with coalition
cabinets, the impact of the CDA and its three predecessors on government
policies should not be exaggerated 32.
4. The CDA between 1980 and 1995
The merger of the ARP, the CHU and the KVP into the CDA can be
regarded as the single most important party-political renewal in the Nether-
lands since the Second World War. Although the Christian Democrats no
longer occupied a majority position in parliament but only about a third of
the seats since 1967, they have been able to maintain their strong position in
the centre of Dutch politics and even strengthen their crucial role during
cabinet formations by merging 33. As a result, until 1994 it was impossible
to form a coalition without the CDA. Mter a brief intermezzo, the Den Uyl
cabinet (1973-1977) in which the Socialists worked together with repre-
sentativesfrom the KVP and theARP, the Christian Democrats between 1977
and 1989 largely continued their cooperation with the Liberals that had
started in 1959, the main issue now being the crisis of the welfare state. In
1986, they even - for the first time in Dutch parliamentary history - openly
announced before the elections that they wanted to continue the sitting
coalition. Paradoxically, this polarisation strategy of the right - as it has been
called - did not lead to a split within the Christian Democratic party but
instead to a landslide victory of nine seats. Moreover, for the first time the
CDA proved able to attract a substantial number of non-religious voters. At
least in part, this was made possible by the popularity of the then Prime
Minister and leader of this party, R.F.M. Lubbers 34. In 1989, however, the
parliamentary caucus of the VVD withdrew its support for the Lubbers II
cabinet. After the Liberals had been defeated in the elections that were
subsequently held, a third Lubbers cabinet was formed that consisted of
Christian Democrats and Socialists. By that time, the PvdA had distanced
itself through a series of programmatic and organisational reviews from styles
and postures adopted in the late 1960s and the 1970s, notably the polarisa-
tion strategy. In a sense, this coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists,
therefore, appeared to mark the end of a period of relative turmoil in Dutch
politics and the return to the system of consensus democracy that had existed
32. With respect to the 1920s and 1930s this has already been argued by 1. Schaffer,
"De Nederlandse confessioneIe partijen 1918-1938" in: L.W.G. Scholten et al.,
De confessionelen. Ontstaan en ontwikkeling van de christelijke pm1ijen (Utrecht,
1968),41-61.
33. K. van Kersbergen, P. Lucardie and H.-M. ten Napel, ed., Geloven in macht.
De christen-democratie in Nederland (Amsterdam, 1993),23-37.
34. H.-M. ten Napel, "Rudolphus (Ruud) Lubbers" in: D. Wilsford, ed., Political Leaders
of Contempormy Western Europe. A Biographical Dictionary (Westport, 1995),
279-287.
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until the 1960s. Especially at the start of the cabinet, it was sometimes
compared to the series of broad "Roman-Red" coalitions headed by Drees
between 1948 and 1958.
In 1994, however, both the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties
performed poorly in the Second Chamber elections. The CDA suffered an
unprecedented loss of 130/0 of the national vote, whereas the PvdA was back
at its historic lowpoint of 1967 with a mere 24% of the vote (a loss of 8%).
D66, on the other hand, performed so well that it actually doubled in size.
The conservative-liberal VVD also gained 5,4% of the votes. By now, it had
become clear that the conservative Liberals were the main beneficiaries of
the depillarisation process. Although the VVD suffered electoral losses
during the second half of the 1980s as a result of leadership problems (after
having polled 23,1% in 1982), in 1994 it took 20% ofthe vote in the national
elections against barely 8% in 1948. In the provincial elections of 1995,
which are not of course completely comparable to Second Chamber elec-
tions, this percentage had climbed to an astonishing 27,2%. For the Social-
ists, the corresponding figures are 24% in 1994 against 28,3% in 1946 and
for the Christian Democrats 22,2% in 1994 against 51,5% in 1946. These
electoral results facilitated the formation, in the summer of 1994, of the first
humanistic cabinet since 1918, composed of Liberals and Socialists. Conse-
quently, if the national election of 1967 was the first "historic" election after
the introduction of a system of proportional representation and universal
suffragein 1917 because the religious parties lost their combined parliamen-
tary majority, the election of 1994 might well be called the second "historic"
election because the Christian Democrats on that occasion also lost their
pivotal position in the process of government formation.
Even after the two years that have passed since the last elections, it is
extremely difficult to interpret what has really happened in 1994. Like
Michael Fogarty in a recent article in The Political Quarterly, however, I see
no reason to differ from the judgment of CDA's own Evaluation Commission
that "while account needs to be taken of recent and prospective develop-
ments in secularisation, the formula for politics on a Christian basis worked
out in the first years after emancipation and the crumbling of the pillars, and
set out in Points ofDeparture, remains as valid as ever and that the defeat of
1994 is largely attributable to "a fit of political incompetence" 35. As Fogarty
rightly argues: "in the 19th and early 20th century a main reason for religious
party formation had been defensive, a drive for 'emancipation' in the sense
of securing equal treatment for schools and other religious institutions in the
face of attacks from Marxists and ideological Liberals, with a sub-theme of
securing equal consideration for Catholics in a country which had tradition-
ally seen itself as Protestant (...) But there had always been a second reason
for party formation on a religious basis, summed up in the slogan 'emanci-
pation, yes; assimilation, no': the conviction among core believers that
religious belief penetrates or should penetrate every aspect of a believer's life
35. M. Fogarty, "How Dutch Christian Democracy made a new start", The Political
Quarterly, LXVI (1995) 138-155, at 154.
and lead to corresponding patterns of behaviour, something distinctive to
contribute to the rest of the community. With this went and continues to go
the practical judgment that the most effective way to carry this contribution
out in politics is to concentrate Christian forces rather than scatter Christian
influence over other parties or institutions - provided that this is practicable,
as under the Dutch pattern of proportional representation it is" 36.
One example of political incompetence is the way the rapidly deterio-
rating personal and political relationship between the Christian Democratic
prime minister Lubbers, who had already in 1990 indicated that he did not
wanted to continue his job after the next election, and his successor
L.G Brinkman whom he himself had designated, had been dealt with - or
rather had not been dealt with - by the party leadership. This deteriorating
relationship led to increasing tensions between the parliamentary party of
the CDA in the Second Chamber, of which Brinkman was leader, and the
Christian Democratic ministers in the Lubbers III cabinet. In the end, it was
unclear for many Christian Democratic voters whether, by voting for the
CDA, they would support the centre-left policies of the Lubbers III cabinet
or the more conservative policies advocated by the parliamentary party.
More structural factors, however, are also likely to have played a role.
More in particular, it can be argued that once again there has been a change
with regard to the relative importance of the two traditional cleavages in
Dutch society in that social class has lost some of the prominence it had as a
cleavage during most of the post-War period. As a matter of fact, as in other
Western European countries, the Socialists have been so successful in reach-
ing their original political goals that they have in a sense become a party
without a "heartland". The old working class has virtually disappeared,
although because of technological developments (the advent of "the infor-
mation age") new forms of inequality are already emerging. On the other
hand, because of the continuing processes of individualisation and seculari-
sation37, one of the most fundamental issues in Dutch politics today is
whether the Netherlands as a society is gradually disintegrating38, whether
there is such a thing as a "crisis of liberalism". Values issues - both cultural
ones like abortion and euthanasia and social ones like crime, education and
the family - are back on the political agenda. As a result, it is possible to
speak of a new cultural dichotomy between the Liberal parties, which regard
the development of society since the 1960s as predominantly positive, and
the Christian Democrats who tend to emphasize the potential risks and are
therefore somewhat more pessimistic in their outlook 39. To a certain extent,
the CDA can be qualified as a communitarian party, although the ideological
36. Ibid., 142-143.
37. While at present half of the Dutch population still regards itself as "Christian",
according to some researchers this percentage will have dropped to as little as 20% in
the year 2020. ].W. Becker and R. Vink, Secularisatie in Nederland, 1966-1991.
De verandering van opvattingen en enkele gedragingen (Rijswijk, 1994).
38. See, for example, Eigentijds burgerschap. WRR-publication under the direction of
H.R. van Gunsteren (The Hague, 1992).
39. ].Th.J. van den Berg, "Politieke partijen: naar een nieuwe fundering", Socialisme en
Democratie, L (1993) 242-245.
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differences between communitarians like A. Etzioni and the Christian Demo-
cratic political philosophy should not be underestimated. The intriguing
question is which position the Labour Party, which traditionally has had both
a Liberal and a communitarian wing, will eventually choose in this contro-
versy. At present its liberal wing seems to dominate. Consequently the
cultural cleavage largely coincides with the traditional religious cleavage in
Dutch politics. The old antithesis between the religious and the non-religious
parties, therefore, seems to have returned. The socioeconomic cleavage will
not completely disappear, however. This, in combination with the fact that
the three traditional groups in Dutch society - Roman Catholics, orthodox
Protestants and Humanists - are still there, justifies the expectation that not
only the Liberals, but also the Socialists and the Christian Democrats are
likely to remain major actors on the Dutch - and indeed the European - stage
for the foreseeable future, provided that they remain as ideologically outspo-
ken and distinctive as possible. As far as I am concerned, neither the
much-discussed "crisis of party" nor the "crisis of representation" can change
that. Despite the impact that new media technologies will no doubt have on
democratic politics4o, it is difficult to see how we could do without repre-
sentative democracy in general and Liberal, Socialist and Christian Demo-
cratic political parties in particular in the 21st century.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be argued that two major attempts at a "break-
through" of the existing party system have taken place in the course of Dutch
political history, both of which remained largely unsuccessful in the short
term but gained importance over the years 41. The first "breakthrough" was
initiated around 1850 by the orthodox Protestant historian and statesman
Groen van Prinsterer, whose opposition to the spirit of the French Revolution
and to Liberalism eventually paved the way for both Christian party forma-
tion and - much more indirectly - the so-called Coalition of orthodox
Protestants and Roman Catholics that has resulted in a number of cabinets
between 1888 and 1939. Following the Second World War, a second
attempt at a "breakthrough" of the party system was made, this time by the
Socialists in order to put an end to the by then dominant position of the
religious parties in Dutch politics. Although both the orthodox Protestant
parties and the Catholic party re-emerged, the increasing secularisation of
Dutch society as well as far-reaching theological changes within the Protes-
tant and Roman Catholic Churches made them consider possibilities for
co-operation relatively soon afterwards, especially after the historic parlia-
40. ].B. Abramson, F. Christopher Arterton and C.R. Orren, ed., The Electronic
commonwealth. The Impact ofNew Media Technologies on Democratic Politics
(New York, 1988).
41. One of the first to draw this comparison was ].A.H.].S. Bruins Slot, Bezinning en
uitzicht. De motieven der huidige wereldontwikkeling en Ol1ze roeping daarin
(Wageningen, 1952).
mentary election of 1967 ip which they lost the majority of seats in the Second
Chamber that they had enjoyed since 1917. By merging, the Christian
Democrats were initially able to maintain their strong position in the centre
of Dutch politics until 1994 when they once again suffered heavy electoral
losses and a coalition of Socialists and Liberals was formed. Thus, to a certain
extent - there are, of course, also important differences - the situation in
which Dutch Christian Democracy finds itself in 1995 resembles that of the
middle of the 19th century. Once again, Liberalism is dominant. Once
again, also, the Christian Democrats are in opposition to Liberalism and the
spirit of the French Revolution, that is in a sense represented by the coalition
of Socialists and conservative and progressive Liberals.
As I have also argued, however, it is too early to conclude that the
movement is bound to disappear altogether, although the very fact that I
- and others - mention the possibility of a decomposition of Christian
Democracy illustrates how deep the crisis is in which Dutch Christian
Democracy currently finds itself.
